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Default Settings in Defined Contribution Plans – A Comparative Approach to Fiduciary 
Obligation and the Role of Markets 
Dana M. Muir1 
I. Introduction 
The use of default settings in defined contribution (DC) plans is increasing both in the 
United States (U.S.) and in Australia.  A variety of drivers are responsible for the use of default 
settings in these plans.  Behavioral science research indicates that default settings may 
counteract the effect of inertia, which causes people to make less than optimal decisions in DC 
plans, and other impediments to optimal decision making.2   Research on the effect of 
investment allocation in 401(k)3 plan accounts on losses during the financial crisis highlighted 
the danger of investment allocations concentrated in high risk assets, particularly for 
participants close to retirement.4  As a general policy matter, in the U.S. concern has long 
                                                          
1 Arthur F. Thurnau Professor of Business Law, Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the 
University of Michigan. dmuir@umich.edu. 734.763.3091. ©2011.  I appreciate the research 
support provided by Michigan Ross. 
2 E.g. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE, 107-17 (2008). 
3 401(k) plans are a subset of U.S. defined contribution plans.  For more detail on 401(k) plans, 
see EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: SECOND EDITION 2010 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT, 254-71 (Dana M. Muir 
ed. 2010). 
4 Jack VanDerhei, The Impact of the Recent Financial Crisis on 401(k) Account Balances, EBRI 
Issue Brief 326, http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_2-2009_Crisis-Impct.pdf. 
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existed over the numbers of employees who do not participate in 401(k) plans even when they 
have the opportunity to do so.5   
Although both countries have increased the use of default settings in DC plans, U.S. and 
Australian policy makers have taken different approaches to important aspects of default 
investment products.  Both countries take a prescriptive approach to regulation.  The net result 
of U.S. default regulation, however, is that employers are responsible as fiduciaries for the 
selection and monitoring of default (and all other) investment products offered in their plans. 
Other actors involved with the selection, monitoring and management of those investment 
products frequently have limited obligations to the plan participants whose retirement assets 
are invested.6  To date, U.S. regulators have addressed issues observed with default investment 
products during the financial crisis by proposing that participants who hold certain types of 
default investment products receive additional disclosures.  In contrast, Australia is in the 
process of setting strict substantive standards for the default investment products and 
enhancing the fiduciary obligations of the trustees responsible for the management and 
investment of those products.7 
This Article begins, in Part II, with a very brief overview of the DC system in the U.S. and 
a more detailed discussion of the Australian system. Parts III and IV respectively turn to an 
analysis of the use of default settings in each country.  Part V suggests two lessons for the U.S. in 
the Australian approach to default settings.  First, U.S. policy should recognize that disclosure to 
                                                          
5 E.g. KAREN FERGUSON & KATE BLACKWELL, PENSIONS IN CRISIS:  WHY THE SYSTEM IS FAILING AMERICA AND 
HOW YOU CAN PROTECT YOUR FUTURE, 176-78 (1995). 
6 See infra text accompanying notes 71-74. 
7 See infra Part IV. 
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and education of participants who are defaulted into investment products appears to be of 
limited value to those participants.  Second, to the extent possible, the locus of fiduciary 
responsibility for default investment products should be on those who are expert on and 
manage those products.  
II. Defined Contribution Systems and Trends 
a. U.S.  – The Trend to DC Plans and the Use of Defaults 
As of June 30, 2011, employer-based DC plans in the U.S. were estimated to hold 
approximately $4.7 trillion in assets.  401(k) plan assets accounted for approximately $3.2 
trillion of the total.  As a comparison, Americans had $4.9 trillion invested in Individual 
Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and DB plans sponsored by private-sector employers held an 
estimated $2.5 trillion as of that date.8  Some employers sponsor both DB and DC plans but for 
most employees in the U.S. who have an employment-based pension plan that plan now is a DC 
plan.9  Thus DC plans, especially the 401(k) plans that will be the focus of the rest of this article, 
constitute an important component of the retirement planning of many Americans. 
Default settings are used in three contexts in 401(k) plans.10  First, when an employer 
chooses to sponsor a 401(k) plan, each employee eligible to participate in the plan typically has 
the right to decide whether or not to contribute.  So, for example, a 401(k) plan may provide 
                                                          
8 Retirement Assets Total $18.2 Trillion in Second Quarter, (2011), 
http://www.ici.org/pressroom/news/ret_11_q2. 
9 William J. Wiatrowski, Changing Landscape of Employment-based Retirement Benefits, U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/print/cm20110927ar01p1.htm. 
10 Typically these default settings are used in 401(k) plans.  
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only for voluntary employee contributions11 and no employer contributions.  An employee may 
choose not to contribute to such a plan.  Other 401(k) plans provide for both employer and 
employee contributions but each employee still will have a choice of whether to contribute.  In 
such a plan, entitlement to the employer’s contribution may be dependent on the employee 
choosing to contribute.12  In any of these plans the first question for the purpose of a default is 
how to set the default on participation.  If an employee does not make an express decision on 
contributing, should the employee be defaulted into participation (contributing to the plan), an 
approach often known as automatic enrollment, or should the employee be defaulted out of 
participation (not contributing to the plan)?   
Defaults operate at the second level in terms of the amount of an employee’s 
participation.  In the usual example, the employee has been defaulted into participating 
(contributing) to the plan.  But, a determination – a default – needs to be made as to the 
amount of the employee’s contribution.  A variety of logical defaults exist.  The default could be 
set at the maximum pre-tax contribution permitted by the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) rules 
that govern the plan.13  In a plan with an employer match, the default could be set at the 
amount that would maximize the employer’s contribution on behalf of the employee.  A default 
                                                          
11 Although these are contributions that each employee may decide whether to make, for tax 
purposes technically they are characterized as employer contributions.  See MUIR, supra note 3, 
at 256. 
12 Id. at 259-60. 
13 For a discussion of the Internal Revenue Code rules governing maximum pre-tax deferrals, see 
MUIR, supra note 3, at 257-58. 
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could be a fixed dollar amount across all employees, a fixed percentage, or could increase over 
time.14  
The third level at which defaults operate is at the level of investment selection.  Once an 
employee has been defaulted into a 401(k) plan and a default contribution has been 
determined, the contribution must be invested.15  Investment defaults occur in other situations 
as well, including when an employee has elected to contribute to a plan but not selected an 
investment product.16 
b. Australia – The Superannuation System 
i. Brief History of Australia’s “Mandatory” Occupational Pension System 
Australia’s pension system consists of three components, a government administered 
program somewhat similar to the U.S. Social Security system but with means testing, some tax 
incentives for individual savings, and an employment-based system.17  The focus in this Article is 
on the third component of the Australian system – the employment-based component, which 
                                                          
14 See, e.g., Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Save More Tomorrow:  Using Behavioral 
Economics to Increase Employee Savings, 112 J. Pol. Econ. S164 (2004) (evaluating a system 
where a participant’s initial default contributions are set at 3.5% of salary but the rate increases 
at each of the participant’s next four pay raises).  
15
 This investment default may include only the ‘employee’s’ contribution or may also include the amount 
matched or otherwise contributed by the employer.  
16 For discussion on U.S. investment default regulation, see infra Part III. 
17 For more extensive discussion of all three components of the Australian pensions system, see 
Dana M. Muir, Building Value in the Australian Defined Contribution System:  A Values 
Perspective, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 93 (2011). 
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has come to be known as the Superannuation Guarantee (SG System).18  The SG System 
developed in the early 1990s through the Australian system of setting wages and benefits by 
using industry awards.19  In its first iteration the SG System required20 employers to contribute 
three percent of most earnings for most employees to an individual DC account.  The current 
rate of contribution is nine percent and that is scheduled to increase to twelve percent by 
2020.21   
                                                          
18 APRA, A recent history of superannuation in Australia, 2, 
http://www.apra.gov.au/insight/upload/history-of-superannuation.pdf.  Australians typically 
use the term “superannuation” to refer to retirement.  One explanation is that pensions are 
thought to be annuity streams and lump sums historically were more common in Australia than 
annuities. INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY ASSOCIATION ET AL., COMPLEMENTARY AND PRIVATE PENSIONS 
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 2008 502 (2008,) [hereinafter ISSA, ET AL.].    
19 A more detailed history can be found at Muir, supra note 17, at 97-100. 
20 Technically contributions to the SG System are not mandatory.  Instead, Australian law 
requires an employer who fails to make the minimum contribution to pay a charge (tax) to the 
government that is higher than the minimum contribution.  As a result, there is a clear incentive 
to make the minimum contribution and commentators typically refer to the system as one of 
mandatory contributions.  See APRA, A recent history of superannuation in Australia, 4, 
http://www.apra.gov.au/insight/upload/history-of-superannuation.pdf. 
21 See Jeremy Cooper (chair), Final Report: Part Two: Recommendation Packages 297 
[hereinafter Cooper Report, Part II], http://www.supersystemreview.gov.au/. 
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Total superannuation assets were A$1.2822 trillion as of September 2011.  Coverage 
estimates from a 2007 survey indicate that 94 percent of Australian employees are members of 
the SG System.23  Members24 may begin withdrawing funds from their SG System accounts when 
they reach the “preservation age,” which ranges between age 55 and 60, depending on their 
date-of-birth.25 
In the early days of the SG System, nearly all contributions were made to what are 
known as industry funds.  Those funds were established on an industry-by-industry basis and 
governance of the funds was divided between employers and employees.  In mid-2005 
members began to receive the right to choose both the ‘fund’ and the investment product 
within a fund to receive the SG System contributions made on their behalf.  Fund choice gave 
rise to a new set of funds, for-profit funds known as retail funds, which are not affiliated with a 
particular industry.26   
Default settings are used in fewer contexts in Australia than in the U.S. because of the 
structure of the SG System.  Contributions to the system are mandatory for nearly all Australian 
workers so there is no need for a default setting on participation. The minimum level of 
contribution typically is determined either by the minimum statutory threshold, which currently 
                                                          
22
 “A$” designates Australian dollars.  The exchange rate as of December 14, 2011 was $1 = A$0.99 and 
can be calculated using the same calculator at http://www.exchangerate.com/. 
23
 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Trends in Superannuation Coverage, 43 (2009) [hereinafter Trends], at 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4102.0Main+Features70March%202009. 
24
 “Members” is the term used in Australia for those who have SG System accounts.  It is generally 
synonymous with the U.S. term “participant.” 
25
 [Cross-reference to Jonathon Forman’s conference paper.]  
26
 Muir, supra note 17, at 100. 
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is 9 percent, or through enterprise agreements or modern awards, the system that replaced 
industry awards, or employee contracts.  So, there is no need in the SG System for an employer 
to set a specific default for the level of an employee’s contribution.  However, once SG System 
members received the right to choose both the fund and the investment product that would 
receive their contributions, investment default settings became important.27  
 
ii. System as of 2010 and beyond 
In June 2010, an expert panel that had been constituted by the Australian government 
issued a report, known as the “Cooper Report,” on its findings and recommendations.28 The 
Cooper Report contained ten packages of recommendations29  that break down into 177 specific 
recommendations.30  After reviewing the recommendations, the Australian government 
supported 139 of the recommendations31 and in September 2011 issued the key design 
                                                          
27
 See infra Part IV for a discussion of those default settings. 
28Jeremy Cooper (chair), Final Report: Part One:  Overview and Recommendations (2010) v-vi. 
[hereinafter Cooper Report, Part I], http://www.supersystemreview.gov.au/.  
29 Cooper Report – Part I, supra note 28, at 10. 
30 Cooper Report – Part II, supra note 21. 
31 See Australian Government, The Treasury, Stronger Super – Government Response 
[hereinafter Stronger Super – Government Response], 
http://strongersuper.treasury.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=publications.htm.  In parallel 
Australia is in the process of reforming its regulation of financial advisers, including those who 
provide advice to SG members.  See http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byHeadline/11-
294AD%20ASIC%E2%80%99s%20plans%20for%20FoFA%20reforms?opendocument.  
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elements of what it has named Stronger Super.32  As of December 2011 the Stronger Super 
project is at the stage of being circulated as draft legislation.33 This Article focuses on one 
specific component of Stronger Super – the development of a simplified SG System investment 
product that will be the only product eligible to serve as the default for members who do not 
select a fund or investment product.  That simplified product is known as “MySuper.”   Members 
also will have the right to affirmatively choose a MySuper product to receive their 
contributions.34   
The principles underlying MySuper are important in understanding the structure of 
MySuper.  The Cooper panel believed that Australia’s mandatory SG System should permit 
members to choose their level of engagement with the system.  One of the ten principles 
forming the foundation of the Cooper Report included the statement that:  “Financial literacy is 
                                                          
32 Commonwealth of Australia, Stronger Super:  Information Pack, Sept. 21, 2011, [hereinafter 
Key Design] 
http://strongersuper.treasury.gov.au/content/publications/information_pack/downloads/infor
mation_pack.pdf. 
33  The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Superannuation Legislation Amendment 
(Trustee Obligations and Prudential Standards) Bill 2012,   [hereinafter Proposed Trustee and 
Prudential Provisions] 
http://strongersuper.treasury.gov.au/content/exposure_drafts/trustee/downloads/trustee_ed.
pdf; The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Superannuation Legislation Amendment 
(My Super Core Provisions) Bill 2011,  [hereinafter Proposed MySuper Core Provisions] 
http://strongersuper.treasury.gov.au/content/exposure_drafts/mysuper_core_provisions/down
loads/ed_mysuper.pdf.  
34
 Cooper I, supra note 28, at 10. 
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an important long term goal, but a compulsory superannuation system cannot depend on all its 
participants having the skills necessary to comprehend complex financial information or being 
investment experts.”35  
Once the Cooper panel accepted the principle that not every member can or wants to 
develop the expertise to invest their retirement savings, then amendments to enable the SG 
System to accommodate that principle naturally followed. The panel’s innovation was to suggest 
that individuals who do not want to be heavily involved in investment choice could opt into a 
MySuper product – or, in the absence of any choice at all, would be defaulted into a MySuper 
product.  In general, SG System funds will each be permitted to have a single default MySuper 
investment product. MySuper products will provide only a limited menu of services and are 
expected to have relatively low fees that are charged in such a way as to be comparable across 
MySuper products.  The Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) will gather and 
report data on MySuper product performance and fees to facilitate competition among the 
offerings. 36 
 
III. U.S. Approach to Default Settings and Fiduciary Liability 
a. The DOL and QDIAs  
The U.S. landscape for the use of default settings in DC plans changed in 2006 with the 
passage of the Pension Protection Act (PPA),37 which removed a number of barriers to the use of 
default settings.  Although in 1998 and 2000 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had authorized 
the use of defaults to automatically enroll employees in 401(k) plans, few plans adopted 
                                                          
35 Cooper Report – Part I, supra note 28, at 4. 
36
 See Key Design, supra note 32, at v. 
37 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006). 
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defaults.  Plan sponsors were concerned about their potential liability for choosing a default 
investment product, there were issues on how the defaults interacted with state statutes 
limiting wage garnishments, and there was no incentive for plan sponsors to automatically 
enroll employees in 401(k) plans.38  The PPA provided an incentive for plans to use defaults and 
in 2007 the Department of Labor (DOL) issued final regulations that provide some protection 
from fiduciary liability for plan sponsors that select “qualified default investment alternatives” 
(QDIAs) as the plan’s default investment product.39 
Four categories of investment products qualify as QDIAs.  A short-term, capital 
preservation product is permitted only for the first 120 days of an employee’s plan participation.  
Of the three long-term QDIA options, one permits selection of a product that contains 
investments tailored to account for characteristics of the plan participants as a group.  The other 
two QDIA options must be tailored to the characteristics of individual participants.40  The 
regulations explicitly state that “targeted-retirement-date” funds, more commonly known as 
target date funds (TDFs), may qualify as a QDIA.41  Of the 401(k) plans that contain an automatic 
enrollment default feature, approximately 60 percent have designated a TDF as the QDIA.42  
                                                          
38 Steven D. Cohen,  Note, Autoenrollment and Annuitization:  Enabling 401(K) “DB-ation,” 5 
N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 281, 300-01 (2009). 
39
 Fiduciary relief for investments in qualified default investment alternatives, 26 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-5 
(2007).  
40 Id. at § 2550.404c-5(e)(4). 
41 Id. at § 2550.404c-5(e)(4)(i). 
42Department of Labor, Topic:  QDIA -Target Date Fund Disclosure, 
http://www.dol.gov/regulations/factsheets/ebsa-fs-QDIA-TDF.htm. 
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Neither the PPA nor the final regulation completely insulates plan sponsors from 
fiduciary duties regarding QDIAs.  The fiduciary obligations of the actors involved with QDIAs, as 
with all plan-related investments, are determined by a patchwork of varying laws and 
exceptions.43  ERISA governs the fiduciaries charged by the plan, typically the plan sponsor or a 
committee constituted of plan sponsor employees, with selecting and monitoring QDIAs and 
those fiduciaries must execute the duties prudently.44  In contrast, according to long standing 
DOL regulations, which have been the subject of substantial recent debate, many of the entities 
and individuals that provide advice to plan fiduciaries in the choice of QDIAs are exempt from 
the ERISA fiduciary requirements.45    
Entities and individuals, who provide investment advice, are subject to a variety of other 
federal and state laws depending on their status and the scope of advice they provide.  In 
general those who are compensated for providing advice related to investments in securities are 
                                                          
43 A detailed discussion of the fiduciary obligations of the individuals and entities that provide 
investment advice to ERISA plans is beyond the scope of this article.  For a more extensive 
analysis and discussion of the market for financial advice, see [cite DM/JT article]. 
44 See C.F.R.  § 2550.404c-5(b)(3). 
45 See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary,” 65,263, Fed. Reg. 65,278, 65,265 (Oct. 22, 2010) 
(discussing the difficulties in establishing that investment advice providers are ERISA fiduciaries).  
In September 2011 the DOL withdrew the proposed rule and announced that it planned to re-
propose it after revising some of its provisions.  U.S. Department of Labor, US Labor 
Department’s EBSA to re-propose rule on definition of a fiduciary, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/2011/11-1382-NAT.html. 
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subject to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act).46  A number of exceptions exist 
from Advisers Act regulation.47  
b. Proposed changes re: QDIAs  
The global financial crisis and its impact on 401(k) plan investments has led the DOL and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to reconsider the regulation of TDFs in 401(k) 
plans, particularly when they are selected as QDIAs. To date the DOL’s proposed regulatory 
revisions rely on enhanced disclosure to respond to the issues it observed with QDIAs.  
Specifically, the DOL’s proposed regulations, developed in collaboration with the SEC, would 
require that participants in TDFs, including participants defaulted into those funds designated as 
QDIAs, receive information about the TDF.  The disclosure must discuss asset allocation and how 
the allocation changes over time, the fees and costs, and a warning that losses are possible in 
TDFs.48  In addition to the proposed amendments to disclosure regulations, the DOL and SEC 
held joint hearings in 2009 regarding TDFs.49  As a result, in mid-2010 the two agencies 
published a joint investor bulletin intended to educate investors about TDFs.50   
The DOL and SEC efforts to enhance disclosure about TDFs, although undoubtedly well 
intentioned, may have a limited or even a harmful effect.  A significant body of research 
                                                          
46 15 U.S.C.  §§ 80b-1 – 21 (2006). 
47
 See John A. Turner & Dana M. Muir, The Market for Financial Advisers (manuscript on file with author). 
48
 75 Fed. Reg. 73,987 (Nov. 30, 2010) [Note: may have final regs prior to conference/publication] 
49
 DOL/SEC Hearing On Target Date Funds and Similar Investment Options, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/cmt-targetdatefundshearing.html. 
50
 Investor Bulletin:  Target Date Retirement Funds, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/TDFinvestorbulletin.pdf. 
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indicates that “mandated disclosure as a remedy . . . is often ineffective.”51 Studies in behavioral 
branches of psychology, economics and ethics as well as cognitive science indicate that 
disclosure often fails to enable the person receiving the disclosure to act rationally and may 
result in worse substantive behavior by the person providing the disclosure.52 In addition, relying 
on disclosure to address a problem with default settings is inconsistent with a belief that one of 
the primary purposes of default settings is to permit people to remain disengaged from active 
decision making.  
IV. Australian Approach to Defaults 
a. “Current” default investments in superannuation funds  
As noted above,53 when Australians received the right to choose a fund and investment 
product to receive their SG System contributions, it became necessary to establish a default 
investment product for contributions in situations where a member did not make an affirmative 
investment choice.  Australia used various mechanisms to determine the default investment 
product.  In some instances the default fund and product were negotiated through enterprise 
agreements or modern awards.  In other situations the employer typically selected a fund and 
product to receive contributions made on behalf of the employees.  Regardless of whether the 
default fund and investment product were selected through enterprise agreements, modern 
awards or unilaterally by an employer, typically the relevant industry fund and its default 
investment product have been designated as the defaults.54 
                                                          
51
 Robert A. Prentice, Moral Equilibrium:  Stock Brokers and the Limits of Disclosure, [ ] WIS. L. REV. [ ], 
[conclusion] (forthcoming [2012]).  
52
 See generally id.  
53
 See supra text accompanying note 26.  
54
 See Muir, supra note 17, at 100-01, 115. 
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Default products have proven to be popular in the SG System.  In 2009, 68 percent of the 
assets held in industry funds were held in the default product of the particular fund.
55
  And, eighty 
percent of the employees who default into a fund also invest in the fund's default investment 
product.  The Cooper panel’s research indicated that approximately eighty percent of those in the 
default investment product were defaulted into the product.  The implication is that sixty percent 
of SG System members are defaulted into their investment product.
56
  
b. New MySuper Program – Reforms in Progress  
As discussed briefly above,57 in 2010 the Cooper Report proposed a significant overhaul 
of many facets of the SG System. Australia is moving forward with most of the recommended 
reforms.  As of this writing in December 2011, legislation has been proposed on most of the 
recommendations of import for this Article and this section discusses the reforms as outlined in 
the legislative proposals.58  
The key reforms for purposes of this article are those related to development of 
MySuper products, which will serve as the default investments for individuals who do not 
choose an investment fund or product.   MySuper products also will be an available investment 
option for SG System members who wish to elect a simple, diversified, low-cost investment 
product.  MySuper products only may hold members’ investments until they retire.  Once 
                                                          
55
 APRA, Statistics: Annual Superannuation Bulletin June 2010, 40, at tbl. 18 (2011), available at 
http://www.apra.gov.au/Statistics/upload/June-2009-revised-Annual-Superannuation-Bulletin.pdfat 40.. 
56
 Cooper Report, Part I, supra note [], at 9.  
57
 See supra text accompanying notes [ ].  
58
 Proposed Trustee and Prudential Provisions, see supra note [ ]; Proposed MySuper Core 
Provisions, see supra note [ ]. 
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members enter the decumulation phase, they must transfer their assets to another investment 
product. 59  
Trustees of MySuper products will be subject to an enhanced set of duties, which they 
will owe to members.  Trustees, sometimes referred to as corporate trustees, are the entities 
that hold the SG System account assets and under Australian law they are fiduciaries.  There is a 
basic set of requirements for SG System trustees that applies to all corporate trustees of funds 
that hold SG System assets.  The enhanced obligations of MySuper trustees essentially will 
operate as an additional layer of duties.  The enhanced duties required of MySuper trustees are 
to:   
● promote the financial interests of MySuper members, in particular net 
returns; 
● annually assess sufficiency of scale; and 
● Include in their investment strategy an investment return target and 
level of risk for MySuper members.60 
 
 In addition the trustees must be licensed and meet specific standards with respect to the 
operation of a MySuper product.61   
The trustees that hold SG System assets are governed by a board of directors, 
sometimes referred to as trustee-directors. The trustee-directors of any fund that offers a 
MySuper product also will be subject to an enhanced set of duties.  Each trustee-director will 
have an obligation to ensure that the fund’s corporate trustee fulfill its obligations, including the 
duties specific to MySuper products.62 
                                                          
59
 Proposed MySuper Core Provisions, see supra note [ ], at 6-7. 
60 Proposed Trustee and Prudential Provisions, see supra note [ ], at 8. 
61 Proposed MySuper Core Provisions, see supra note [ ], at 15. 
62
 Proposed Trustee and Prudential Provisions, see supra note [ ], at 14. 
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The imposition of enhanced standards on the trustees and director-trustees of MySuper 
products is consistent with the Cooper Panel’s finding that Australia’s earlier grant to members 
of the right to choose investment funds and products failed to result in a competitive fund 
market and optimal investment decision-making.  The panel observed that the failure of many 
members to affirmatively make a fund election contributed to the lack of an efficient market for 
SG System funds but other factors also contributed.  According to the panel, members lack 
awareness of the performance and fees associated with their retirement investments in part 
because they do not actively make payments into their accounts and, in many cases, do not 
expect to access the funds for many years.  In addition fund performance and fees often can be 
difficult to compare and switching funds takes effort and time.63  
V. Lessons for the U.S.  
In recent years the U.S. and Australia have increasingly recognized the value of default 
settings in defined contribution plans.  The significant differences between their approaches to 
private-sector retirement plans carry over into the policy decisions they have made on default 
settings.  Two characteristics of the Australian approach offer lessons for the U.S.  First, Australia 
has recognized that many people who opt, implicitly or explicitly, into the default investment 
products do not want to be actively involved in monitoring the investments in their accounts.  
Second, employers also may not have the expertise or the inclination to become experts in 
investment product selection and monitoring.   
a. Disclosure and Default Investment Products 
Consider what the U.S. learned about default investment products from the financial 
crisis.  With respect to TDFs, EBSA determined that some participants in TDFs designated as 
QDIAs had incurred significant losses because some TDFs had maintained substantial equity 
                                                          
63 Cooper I at 7-8. 
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allocations even with near-term target retirement dates.  EBSA’s short-term response, 
coordinated with the SEC, was to issue an investor bulletin explaining the risks of investing in 
TDFs.64  The bulletin contained three pages of useful information in an easy to read format 
combining charts and questions and answers.65   In the longer term, EBSA has been drafting 
enhanced disclosure guidelines that would require plans to provide participants in QDIAs more 
information about those funds.66  Ultimately that guidance and the required disclosures are 
likely to include valuable information for the plan sponsors and participants that read and 
understand them. 
However, any approach that addresses issues with default investment products through 
education and disclosure is entirely inconsistent with the principles of a default regime.  As 
Australia recognizes, no retirement system can rely on all individuals in the system to acquire 
and exercise the expertise required to make appropriate investment decisions.  The U.S. 
implicitly decided that investment education and individual decision-making are of limited value 
for some participants when Congress provided, through the PPA, incentives for plans to 
implement automatic enrollment. There is nothing in the U.S. system of 401(k) and similar 
accounts that ensures that participants will read investor bulletins, disclosures delivered by their 
employers or any other investment-related materials, let alone that they will understand that 
material or take action based on it.  Research indicates that many participants do none of those 
things.  And, research on the efficacy of disclosure increasingly indicates that disclosures are 
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ineffective to address conflicts of interest.67  That general research on disclosures is consistent 
with the research into heuristics and biases in 401(k) plan decision making.68  
The success of a system of defaults, especially defaults into investment products, 
depends on the selection of appropriate default settings.  It is incoherent to believe that default 
settings are important because an overwhelming array of research shows that individuals are 
subject to biases, lack interest in becoming investment experts, etc. and then, when it turns out 
that there may be issues with some default settings respond by providing information to those 
same individuals so they can determine whether the default settings are appropriate or not.  By 
definition, the appropriate locus of decision making in default settings is not the individual plan 
participant.   That raises the obvious question of where the locus of decision making and legal 
liability should be.  On this point, Australia’s approach also offers lessons for the U.S.   
b. The Role of Employers and Financial Services Firms in a Default System  
In the U.S., plan sponsors, or to be more transparent, the employers who voluntarily 
sponsor 401(k) and other DC plans, nearly always make the decisions on what investments are 
offered in those plans, including the decision on the plan’s default option, typically a QDIA.  In 
selecting the QDIA, the plan sponsor acts as a fiduciary, and must prudently select and monitor 
the QDIA.69  Of course a plan sponsor that is not an expert on what investment products are the 
best choices for its employees may engage experts to provide advice on the selection and 
monitoring of QDIAs and the other available investment products. But, under current 
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regulations, many of the individuals and entities that provide advice to employers on that 
decision are able to avoid fiduciary status.70 
 Consider a typical situation where the employer as a fiduciary, with the advice of a non-
fiduciary does as most employers who choose QDIA’s do and chooses a TDF, a species of mutual 
fund, as the QDIA.  The entity that holds the TDF’s assets is almost certainly an investment 
company subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940.71  Professor Langevoort has succinctly 
explained the relationship between mutual funds and their investment advisers and highlighted 
the conflict of interest:  “The typical mutual fund is organized by a sponsor who expects to profit 
by providing advisory and other services to the fund, with returns growing as the fund grows in 
size.”72  A review of the literature on the lack of competitiveness among mutual funds, the 
widespread violations of various laws through actions such as late trading, market timing, etc., 
the compensation levels of their advisers is beyond the scope of this Article.  Suffice it to say 
here, a number of commentators argue that the current regulation of mutual funds has not 
given rise to a competitive market where mutual fund investors’, particularly 401(k) investors’, 
interests are the primary concern of mutual funds and their advisers. 73 
 Australia is taking an approach to the regulation of MySuper products that differs 
significantly from the U.S. approach to QDIA and mutual fund regulation.  Australian employers 
will be obligated to choose a MySuper product that is registered as such with ASIC.  Employers 
will have access in making their choices to comparative data reported to and disseminated by 
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ASIC.  There is little or no liability for an employer that chooses a MySuper product in this 
system if it turns out that the product has high fees, a poor investment strategy, or the 
product’s trustee fails to execute its duties to fund members. 
Instead, the trustees of the MySuper product bear not just the standard fiduciary 
obligations of fund trustees but also the enhanced responsibility to ensure that the investments 
and fees are appropriate for the employees whose retirement savings are invested in their 
MySuper product.   Thus, in Australia, the responsibility for appropriate investment decisions, 
including decisions that affect product fees, coincides with both the locus of investment 
expertise and responsibility for investment strategy.   Or, to state it slightly differently, the 
fiduciary responsibility owed to those whose retirement assets are invested with MySuper funds 
will reside with those with the expertise and power to manage funds.  
VI. Conclusion 
The U.S. and Australia have both increased the use of default settings in the 
employment-based DC components of their retirement income systems. This is consistent with a 
growing body of research that indicates that many employees do not want to actively manage 
their retirement savings and financial education may not be very effective.  The difference 
between the two countries is that Australia is in the process of implementing a system of default 
investment products that recognizes and respects the different levels of involvement desired by 
different employees.  That system of default investment products provides substantive 
protections for those who trust their retirement assets to the default system by holding 
accountable the providers of the default products.  There are significant differences between 
the U.S. and Australian retirement systems, including the Australian mandatory contribution.  
However, the U.S. should consider whether a system that provides for default retirement 
investments owes more than just enhanced disclosure obligations to those who trust their 
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retirement savings to the system.  And, in a system of voluntary plan sponsorship, it is not 
obvious why the employers who sponsor DC plans should have fiduciary liability for the 
selection and monitoring of default investment products.  
 
